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The Tragic Story of the Federal Coal
Leasing Program
Mark Squillace
T he federal government owns about eighty-eight bil-U.S. coal reserves, which amounts to nearly 10 per-c nt of the world's k own reserves of coal. Because
the United States currently consumes about one billion tons
of coal each year, federal reserves alone could satisfy current
domestic consumption rates for more than eighty years. The
federal government, as the owner of vast quantities of coal,
powerfully influences the market when it decides whether to
sell coal. From the earliest days of federal coal policy to the
present, the federal government has exercised its authority in a
way that undermines the significant public interests associated
with this resource. Ideally, the problems with the federal coal
leasing program would have been addressed two decades ago
when coal sales were booming. But the issues remain critically
important today, as coal companies look overseas to expand
the market for the federal coal they are producing. This article
explores the source of the problems and offers a road map for
reforming the leasing program.
The History of Federal Coal Policy
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the federal
government encouraged western settlement, largely through
programs that granted land ownership rights to settlers. Early
on, federal land known to contain coal received no special
treatment and was available for acquisition by purchase or
land grant. In 1864, however, Congress enacted the 1864 Coal
Lands Act, which required federal lands known to possess coal
to be sold at public auction. Subsequently, Congress passed
the Coal Lands Act of 1873, which limited the size of each
coal land entry and set minimum per acre sale prices. In 1906,
President Theodore Roosevelt responded to the public outcry
over speculation of public coal lands and other abuses of the
government land policy by withdrawing more than sixty-four
million acres of land from coal entry. Roosevelt's action was
designed to give the Department of the Interior an opportu-
nity to determine the presence, quality, and quantity of coal on
these public lands. But Western settlers, who faced the possi-
ble loss of land they were claiming under the Homestead Act,
pressured Congress and President Roosevelt to come up with
a solution that balanced the settlers' interests with the fed-
eral interest in coal lands. One simple corrective was to reopen
lands for entry and settlement that were found not to contain
coal. Interior Secretary James Garfield suggested a second and
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more long-term solution. Why not separate the surface and
mineral rights in public land sales? Roosevelt forwarded this
idea to the Congress.
In 1909, Congress enacted the Agricultural Coal Lands
Act, which allowed settlers who made non-fraudulent agricul-
tural entries on lands later found to contain coal to take legal
ownership of the surface, while reserving the coal rights for the
federal government. In 1910, Congress reopened all of the coal
lands that had been withdrawn by President Roosevelt, but it
limited the settlers' rights to the surface estate.
An internal BLM study
conducted in 1970 revealed
that less than 10 percent of
federal land being leased for
coal production was actually
producing coal.
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA)
expanded the split estate policy by limiting settlers' rights to
the land surface for all federal lands available for homestead-
ing. The SRHA required every patent to include "a reservation
to the United States of all the coal and other minerals in the
lands so entered and patented, together with the right to pros-
pect for, mine and remove the same." 43 U.S.C. § 299(a).
The SRHA also increased the size of public land available for
a homestead patent to 640 acres. The SRHA allowed a coal
company to file "notice" with the Interior Department and sur-
face landowner, which then gave the coal company exclusive
exploratory access for minerals over the land from every other
person, including the surface landowner. If deposits were dis-
covered, the company would then have the right to mine and
remove any coal or other mineral deposits for its own profit. Id.
at § 299(b)(2)-(3).
In 1920, in response to the nascent conservation move-
ment and to encourage better management of federal mineral
resources, Congress enacted the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. The MLA applies to all deposits
of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, and gas on fed-
eral land. As originally enacted, the MLA created two types
of leases for mineral lands. Preference right leasing allowed
applicants to file and receive a two-year prospecting permit
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that authorized miners to search for particular types of min-
eral deposits on areas of public land where no known deposits
existed. If minerals were found in commercial quantities, the
permit holder was entitled to receive an exclusive lease for the
land to mine the mineral. When minerals were known to exist
on federal land, the MLA established a system of competitive
leasing whereby leases were awarded to the highest qualified
bidder.
Among other things, the MLA required lessees to use rea-
sonable diligence to develop and continuously operate their
leases for mineral production. This was not a significant issue
for coal properties because there was little demand for fed-
eral coal and few leases were issued before 1960. The number
of federal coal leases increased abruptly in the 1960s, as did
the size of the leases. Production, however, remained almost
nonexistent on these leases, and the diligent development
requirement of the MLA was largely ignored on most coal
leases. See ROBERT NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL
PoLIcy at 25 (1983).
By 1970, speculation had become rampant. The govern-
ment had leased nearly sixteen billion tons of federal coal, yet
little federal coal was actually being mited. An internal BLM
study conducted in 1970 revealed that less than 10 percent of
federal land being leased for coal production was actually pro-
ducing coal. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Land Management, Holdings and Development of Federal Coal
Leases (1970). As a result, calls for reform became more pro-
nounced. In 1973, Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton
imposed a moratorium on all new coal leasing and the issu-
ance of any new coal prospecting permits "in order to allow
the preparation of a program for the more orderly development
of coal resources upon the public lands of the United States
under the Mineral Leasing Act, with proper regard for the pro-
tection of the environment." Secretarial Order No. 2952, 38
Fed. Reg. 4682 (Feb. 17, 1973).
Modern Federal Coal Policy
Congress responded to the problems with federal coal pol-
icy in 1976 with the enactment of the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act (FCLAA). Pub. L. No. 94-377 (1976). The
House Report identified seven specific problems that FCLAA
was designed to address: (1) speculation; (2) concentration
of holdings; (3) fair return to the public; (4) environmen-
tal protection, planning, and public participation; (5) social
and economic impacts of coal mining; (6) the need for infor-
mation; and (7) maximum economy recovery of the resource.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-681 (1975).
After several attempts, new federal regulations under
FCLAA were promulgated in 1979, and then amended in
1982. It was not long, however, before problems with the
new program emerged. In 1982, the Department of Inte-
rior sold two coal leases in the Powder River Basin that were
legally suspect and publicly criticized for not receiving fair
market value. The ensuing public outcry led Congress to cre-
ate The Commission on Fair Market Value Policy for Federal
Coal Leasing (known as the Linowes Commission), which
was tasked with investigating federal coal leasing policies. The
Linowes Commission published a report with thirty-six rec-
ommended changes designed to promote a more predictable
and stable coal leasing program, to encourage more competi-
tion between bidders, to assure that the government received
fair market value, and to set standards for lease selection and
development.
The basic structure for the federal coal leasing program
established under FCLAA was set out in the 1979 and 1982
regulations. The process begins with the establishment of "coal
production regions" by BLM. The rules do not define the term
"coal production regions," but the words seem self-explanatory.
The meaning of the phrase "coal production region" is critical
to the operation of the leasing program because the rules make
clear that "[c]oal production regions shall be used for establish-
ing regional leasing levels. . . ." 43 C.ER. § 3400.5 (2011).
Under these regulations, coal leasing is supposed to be car-
ried out in four phases. First comes land use planning, which
is designed to ensure that coal leasing passes through four
screening procedures. The first screen requires the agency to
determine the development potential for coal in the plan-
ning area. This analysis includes estimates of the quality and
amount of economically recoverable federal coal reserves.
Next, the agency considers whether lands may be unsuitable
for mining. Lands deemed unsuitable are dropped from consid-
eration from leasing. Multiple use trade-offs are then assessed
to determine whether other important uses may be incompat-
ible with mining. Potential conflicts may lead to removing
additional areas from consideration for leasing. Finally, the
agency consults with surface owners to obtain the necessary
consent for mining as required by the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act.
Once planning is completed and a final land use plan
(Resource Management Plans on BLM lands and Land
and Resource Management Plans on Forest Service lands)
is adopted, regional leasing levels are supposed to be set
through a rather complex process. This process is guided
by the Regional Coal Team (RCT), an advisory committee
established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act that
includes three federal agency representatives and two represen-
tatives from the affected state. The chair of the RCT provides
recommendations from the RCT's members to the appro-
priate BLM State Director who, among other things, must
outline alternative leasing levels. The RCT then considers
the BLM State Director's review and transmits to the Secre-
tary alternative leasing levels and a preferred leasing level.
After various consultations, the Secretary then considers a
variety of factors before setting the lease level. Among the fac-
tors that must be considered are: (1) "the potential economic,
social, and environmental effects of coal leasing. . ."; (2) the
"expressed industry interest . . . and indications of the demand
for coal. . ."; (3) the expected production from exiting federal
and nonfederal coal holdings; (4) "the level of competition
in the region. . . ."; (5) U.S. coal production goals, national
energy needs, and the demand for federal coal; and (6) public
comment. 43 C.FR. § 3400.2(c). Leasing levels must be estab-
lished for every coal production region where activity planning
is conducted. Id. at § 3420.2(e).
Coal lease activity planning is the third step, and it is a
critical part of the leasing process. Here, the RCT guides the
tract delineation process, including the selection of tracts that
will meet the leasing level set by the Secretary. The activ-
ity-planning phase includes a review of the land use plan and
a long-range market analysis that is supposed to help BLM
decide whether to proceed with leasing. If the RCT decides to
(continued on page 35)
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move forward with leasing, a panel of science advisors and an
internal BLM review council are appointed to assist the RCT
in tract delineation, site-specific analysis, and EIS preparation.
A call for expressions of interest in leasing is also published in
the Federal Register. Responses may be used by the RCT in
delineating potential coal lease tracts. The RCT then recom-
mends a regional leasing level to the Secretary and identifies,
ranks, analyzes, and selects tracts for study in a regional coal
lease sale environmental impact statement (EIS). A regional
lease sale decision is then published in the Federal Register.
Finally, the lease sale is scheduled. To achieve the maxi-
mum economic recovery of the coal resource, public comment
is solicited on fair market value and appropriate mining meth-
ods. A regional evaluation team then prepares its own estimate
of the value of each lease tract. Following a thirty-day period
of public notice, the lease sale is offered by means of sealed
bids. This is sometimes called the "bonus bid," and it is paid up
front to the federal government by the high bidder, assuming
BLM accepts the high bid as representing fair market value.
The bonus bid is paid on top of a 12.5 percent production
royalty for federal surface-mined coal as provided under the
FCLAA. 30 U.S.C. § 207; 43 C.ER. § 3473.3-2(a)(1) (2011).
The royalty rate for coal mined by underground methods is
set at 8 percent. Id. at § 3473.3-2(a)(2). Both the bonus bid
and royalty payments are shared equally by the state and fed-
eral governments. A post-sale analysis of the bids is then made
recommending acceptance of the high bids. Only high bids
representing fair market value may be accepted. A successful
bidder must also pass an antitrust review by the Department of
Justice.
There are no exceptions to the phase one land use planning
and phase four lease sale activity requirements. But the rules
establish a "lease on application" process (usually described
as "lease by application" or LBA) that effectively allows BLM
to avoid phases two and three of the leasing process-the
stages where the federal government sets the leasing levels
and designs tracts for lease sale-in two circumstances. First,
LBAs are allowed for emergency leasing within designated fed-
eral coal production regions. Such leases are designed for those
limited circumstances where federal coal might be bypassed or
where a new lease is needed to maintain production levels in
the near term. Second, LBAs are allowed for leases issued "out-
side coal production regions."
In 1990, the Powder River RCT decided that the Powder
River Basin (PRB), which straddles the Wyoming/Montana
border and is one of the richest coal production regions in
the world, was not a coal production region. The RCT made
this decision notwithstanding the fact that more than 40 per-
cent of U.S. coal production comes from the PRB and that
coal is shipped to more than thirty U.S. states and several for-
eign countries. The reasons for declaring that the PRB is not
a coal production region are somewhat unclear, but in a letter
responding to a request from environmental groups to recer-
tify the Powder River Basin as a coal production region, BLM
explained that its decision to decertify the area was "based
on current and projected market conditions, the potential for
emergency leasing, the level or industry interest in Federal
coal, public comment, and views expressed by the RCT and
the affected state governor . . .. Leasing demand in the decer-
tified [region] was anticipated to be limited to replacement
of exhausted reserves, which could be accomplished through
maintenance leasing." Letter from Robert Abbey, Director,
BLM, to Jeremy Nichols, Executive Director of WildEarth
Guardians (Jan. 28, 2011). BLM's rules, however, say nothing
about an exception for "maintenance leasing," and the very
notion of such leasing is arguably anticompetitive, especially
in an area where more than 40 percent of the nation's coal
supply is produced.
Indeed, since 1991, BLM has leased nearly 7.3 billion tons
of federal coal in the Powder River Basin on tracts designed
by existing coal operators without the benefit of setting regu-
lar leasing levels or engaging in regional sale activity planning.
Moreover, all of the historic federal coal production regions in
the country have been decertified, thus essentially eliminating
the critical second and third steps in the leasing process pro-
vided for under the federal rules.
As a practical matter this means that, contrary to the
plain language of FCLAA and BLM rules, the coal industry-
not the federal government-drives the coal leasing process.
Under BLM's rules, the Department of Interior was supposed
to take the lead by first deciding whether there was sufficient
demand for new coal leases to warrant setting lease sale levels
and, if so, then designing tracts to maximize competition and
ultimately the return to the state and federal treasuries. On
only one occasion during the modern era of leasing has Inte-
rior said no to a proposed LBA sale-and that case involved
the refusal of a surface owner to consent as required by law.
BLM sometimes has rejected the bid received at a lease sale on
the grounds that it was lower than BLM's determination of fair
market value, but the agency has never come close to testing
the limits of the market by, for example, setting a minimum
bid price that better reflects the national market for coal.
Contrary to the plain language
of FCLAA and BLM rules, the
coal industry-not the federal
government-drives the coal
leasing process.
Under the current system, industry decides whether,
where, and how much coal they want to lease, subject to BLM
approval and in certain cases adjustment of the boundaries
of an LBA tract proposed by industry. Not surprisingly, the
industry has demanded far more leasing than some believe the
market can rationally bear arid has applied for leasing tracts
that adjoin existing mines and that are arguably designed by
the industry applicant to avoid competition. In the Powder
River Basin, for example, BLM has held twenty-seven coal
lease sales over the last twenty-one years. Twenty-two of those
sales have attracted one bidder and, in every case, the sole bid-
der was the owner of the adjacent coal mine. The other five
have attracted just two bidders and most of the second bidders
owned another adjacent mine. Bonus bids for PRB tracts have
ranged from 0.111 cents per ton for 166.4 million tons of coal
at the Eagle Butte mine in 1995 to $1.1016 per ton for 130.196
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tons of coal at the Caballo West mine in 2011. Most bids were
well below one dollar per ton.
This record does not reflect the kind of robust competi-
tion that Congress intended when it passed the FCLAA. Five
sales did attract two bidders, including the Caballo West sale
in 2011. However, a two-bid sale that is fought over between
neighboring coal companies does not constitute a sale that is
as competitive as it might otherwise be. One example from
1998 shows how competition increases revenue: The lessee
applicant bid $124 million and the competing (and winning)
bidder offered $158 million, resulting in an additional $34
million for state and federal treasuries. Likewise, a competing
company in the 2011 Caballo West sale noted above beat the
applicant's bid by $15 million.
By undervaluing coal, the
current federal coal leasing
program encourages more
coal leasing, production, and
consumption as well as the
marketing of federal coal
outside the United States.
If the lease sales were designed by BLM to maximize rev-
enues and BLM had been able to get bids at a substantially
higher market value, the government arguably would have
realized hundreds of millions of dollars of additional reve-
nues. Indeed, FLCAA's goals of avoiding speculation, assuring
a fair return to the public, and minimizing the concentration
of holdings have all been undermined by BLM's implementa-
tion of FCLAA. Just a handful of companies now account for
all of the coal produced in the Powder River Basin of Wyo-
ming, even while PRB coal accounts for more than 45 percent
of U.S. coal production. Even without this consolidation in
the industry, it would likely be difficult for new players to break
into the PRB coal market, given the enormous capital costs
associated with such entry. Still, by undervaluing coal, the cur-
rent federal coal leasing program encourages more coal leasing,
production, and consumption as well as the marketing of fed-
eral coal outside the United States, where the coal companies
can demand prices that are far beyond what they pay for fed-
eral coal rights.
The sale price of coal at the mine mouth on federal lands is
far less than the price for coal available virtually anywhere else
in the world. The latest figures available from the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) show that an average 2010 sales
price of Wyoming coal, which is primarily federal PRB coal,
was $12.03 per ton on the open market. See Average Sales
Price of Coal by State and Disposition, DOE/EIA-0584(2010).
The highest price for coal in any of the Western states was in
Colorado, where the EIA lists the 2010 open market price at
$39.45 per ton. By contrast, the 2010 price of Appalachian
coal ran as high as $96.15 in Virginia, but was mostly in the
$60-70 range. Id. All of these prices have declined since 2010
due to the precipitous drop in domestic demand for coal, but
the relative values are fundamentally the same.
To be sure, the value of any coal varies depending on Btu
value, sulfur content, and other factors. But even accounting
for these differences the price of PRB coal in particular is out
of line with the domestic market generally. Indeed, while PRB
coal generally has a lower Btu value, it is widely praised for its
low sulfur content, which is highly valued by utilities.
The price of coal worldwide is generally higher than in the
United States. When the sale price for coal at the mine mouth
in the PRB is less than ten dollars per ton, as it is today, the
export market begins to look very attractive. But why would
the federal government sell its coal so cheaply that it becomes
attractive to ship that coal halfway around the world? See
EIA, U.S. Coal Exports and Imports, 2006-2012 (June, 2012)
(noting that 107 million tons of coal were exported from the
United States in 2007). If the federal government is indeed
underpricing its coal, it has cost the state and federal treasuries
billions of dollars in lost receipts.
Reforming the System
There seems little doubt that the current system has
brought about a significant loss of public revenues. One recent
study estimates the loss of public revenue at $28 billion. Tom
Sanzillo, The Great Giveaway: An Analysis of the United
States' Long-term Trend of Selling Federally-owned Coal for
Less than Fair Market Value, Institute for Energy Econom-
ics and Financial Analysis (June, 2012). What can be viewed
as a substantial subsidy to the coal industry comes at a time
when public concerns about the adverse impacts from coal
development and use have never been greater. One argument
frequently invoked to support current coal leasing protocols
policy is that such actions implement the provision of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 that promotes the increased use of
coal to meet domestic energy needs. 42 U.S.C. § 13571. But
FCLAA demands that the government obtain fair market
value for its coal, and nothing in the Energy Policy Act under-
cuts that legal requirement.
BLM could begin to solve the problem with the current
coal leasing program by recertifying the Powder River Basin
and all of the other federal coal producing areas of the coun-
try as "coal production regions." In taking such action, BLM
could also make clear its commitment to assuming responsibil-
ity for setting leasing levels, engaging in regional sale activity
planning, and designing lease tracts all with a goal of maximiz-
ing competition. Given the vast quantities of coal that have
already been leased under the current flawed system, this is
only a starting point.
In thinking about reform in 2012, it is hard not to look
back at what might have been. Imagine, for example, that the
federal government had decided twenty years ago, in response
to the Linowes Commission report, to experiment with mini-
mum bid prices to see what the market could tolerate. They
might have started the process with a minimum bid price of
two, three, or even five dollars per ton. This would have mod-
estly increased the mine mouth price of PRB coal as compared
with the prices where most PRB coal is sold, while still keep-
ing PRB coal competitive except in the most remote areas of
the country.
Consider, for example, how a minimum bid of three dollars
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per ton would have impacted revenues for the eleven lease
sales that occurred during the decade between 1991 and 2000.
These sales encompassed a little more than 2.64 billion tons of
coal and the bonus bids ranged from 11.1 cents to 38.5 cents.
(The high bid was for the only sale during this decade that
attracted more than one bidder.) Bonus bid revenues for this
2.64 billion tons of coal totaled $612.91 million. If, however,
the government had imposed a minimum bid of three dollars
per ton-and accepted that bid in every case as the fair market
value and had been able to sell the same amount of coal-rev-
enues would have increased to $7.92 billion, or nearly thirteen
times the revenues that were realized from the actual sales.
At five dollars per ton, revenues would have soared to $13.2
billion. Moreover, because the sale price of the coal would pre-
sumably.have been higher, the 12.5 percent royalties paid to
the state and federal governments would also have risen dra-
matically. Consider, for example, that a two-dollar increase in
the price of PRB coal translates into $100 million in additional
revenues for the approximately 400 million tons of federal
PRB coal sold each year.
It is possible that the sale of PRB woild have declined at
these prices, but PRB coal would still have been more than
competitive with most other coal around the world even if it
had cost three, five, or even ten dollars more per ton. If the
government had leased just half as much coal but demanded at
least three dollars per ton as a bonus bid, the state and federal
governments would have realized more than six times the rev-
enues actually realized, or nearly four billion dollars.
We will never know what revenues were lost as a result of
the government's mismanagement of the coal leasing program.
But what we do know is that BLM has refused to recertify
the PRB as a coal production region and begin the process of
establishing a truly competitive leasing program. In Novem-
ber 2009, the WildEarth Guardians and other organizations
petitioned BLM to recertify the PRB as a coal production
region for many of the reasons outlined in this article. It took
BLM more than a year to respond. When it finally did, BLM
declined the request, claiming that the PRB is most effec-
tively managed as a decertified coal region. A challenge to this
decision in federal court was recently dismissed, not on the
merits, but on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65411.
One of the most tragic aspects of this story is that so many
bad decisions were made during a time of robust coal mar-
kets, when assertive government planning and leasing policies
might have yielded substantial public benefits. The domestic
market for coal is now in decline, and one wonders whether
it is too late to fix the problems documented in this article.
But one important trend that has yet to play out could ben-
efit from a new commitment to a sound coal leasing policy.
Even as domestic coal markets have waned, coal companies
have begun looking overseas for new markets. Asia looks espe-
cially attractive because of China's seeming insatiable demand
for new energy, and its historical willingness to pay more than
$100 per ton for coal. Some federal coal is currently shipped to
Asia out of a deepsea terminal in British Cplumbia, and coal
companies are now eyeing locations for other possible ports in
the Pacific Northwest. Before any new ports are built, the fed-
eral government must reform its coal leasing policy to ensure
that what amounts to pricing subsidies to the coal industry
comes to an end.
We will never know what
revenues were lost as a
result of the government's
mismanagement of the coal
leasing program.
Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, among others, has called
on the federal government to prepare an environmental
impact statement to consider the consequences of increasing
exports of domestic coal through new terminals on the West
Coast. Such a review might offer a useful vehicle for consider-
ing the role that federal coal leasing policy plays in promoting
greater exports of domestic coal. This would also allow a pub-
lic review of the prospect of making the PRB a major player in
promoting further carbon emissions around the world.
At a bare minimum, the federal government has a legal
obligation to ensure that it is not giving away federal coal-
our coal-at fire sale prices. We cannot go back and redo the
last thirty years of the federal coal leasing program, but neither
should we accept the current broken system. We can do
better. 9
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2012 State of the Union address, he stated his commitment
to an "all-of-the-above strategy" for energy development that
includes developing American oil and gas resources. The goal
of this energy strategy is to reduce the nation's dependence on
foreign oil. But are other existing laws undercutting this effort?
We feature an article focusing on the laws governing export
of petroleum, petroleum products and coal extracted in the
United States and how they potentially impact the nation's
efforts to achieve energy independence.
Finally, we step back and take a broader view. A look at
how the challenges of balancing mineral extraction with
competing land uses and environmental protection are being
faced outside the United States can be very instructive. One
country that recently has taken significant strides in develop-
ing a sustainable mining policy is the small but mineral rich
Philippines. Our last feature article details the development
of an executive order signed in July 2012 that substantially
reformed Philippine mining policy, and discusses issues associ-
ated with implementation of that new mining policy.
Jean Feriancek
Issue Editor
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